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Heidegger and Schelling: The 
Finitude of Being 
 
 
Michael G. Vater 





The recent publication of Heidegger's 1936 lectures on 
Schelling's essay on human freedom1 reveals yet another point of 
transition along the way from Being and Time to the later works on 
language and poetry. It brings to light an influence on Heidegger 
almost as weighty as his reading of Hölderlin and Nietzsche in that 
same decade, an influence hitherto only hinted at in published works. 
It now appears that Heidegger's essays on identity, on grounding, on 
being, all bear the imprint of a dialogue with Schelling, that he 
discovered in the latter thinker a valuable prototype of his notion of 
being. If the reader is not aware of the direction of Heidegger's own 
thought, the 1936 lectures on their own reveal little of the dialogue. 
Schelling's Investigations2 is a difficult and obscure work, and 
Heidegger confines himself to close textual work, with care and insight 
bringing even the most obscure passages out of allegory into lucid 
philosophical statement. The lectures are a triumph of pedagogy, the 
most careful attempt to date to read Schelling as an ontological 
thinker. Yet their smooth surface, scholarly poise, and objectivity leave 
hidden a question of real interest: Why should Schelling, commonly 
thought a weak link to Hegel or the first symptom of "existentialist" 
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anti-Hegelian reaction, be of interest to Heidegger the philosopher? 
And why, in particular, should this most exotic of Schelling's works, 
touched by the influence of theosophists like Boehme, be accepted by 
Heidegger as one of the crucial moments of the West's historical 
thinking through of being? 
 
There are certain affinities between Heidegger and Schelling, 
including a shared preoccupation with the question of being, an 
anthropological or "anthropomorphic" approach to that question, 
common interests in language and temporality, common repugnance 
for the domination which "things" exercise in ontology, for the easy 
way in which being-at-hand wins acceptance as the paradigmatic 
mode of being. But what fundamentally attracts Heidegger's interest 
and moves him to take Schelling as seriously as Plato, Kant, and 
Nietzsche in the "history of being" is the direction and movement of 
thought found in the Investigations. In what Hegel found a work 
interesting but lacking in significance since it handled an isolated 
problem3 Heidegger discovers a line of thought which leads earnest 
ontological thought or "system" away from the formalism of logical 
categories such as identity and difference to categories of concrete 
spirit, human existence if you will, to process, decision, history, to 
finitude, to being as a doublefold structure in which man finds himself 
ambiguously placed as the inbetween. 
 
The central question of Schelling's essay is whether spirit can be 
made the basis and central point of systematic philosophy, not merely 
its product, whether spirit can be grasped without the reduction of 
selfhood, otherness, and their uneasy togetherness to ciphers in an 
abstract calculus. The key to a live grasp of spirit, first provided by 
Kant, is the notion of freedom. Yet Kantian freedom is itself abstract 
and formal, a general notion of self-determination which interprets the 
self off the model of abstract identity (A=A) and is unable to specify 
the quality of causation this "freedom" involves. Schelling wanted to 
surpass this Kantian notion of freedom to enable systematic 
philosophy to reach down to a founding act of spirit—an act which 
founds spirit's sense of self and can accordingly found "system" on the 
same basis. This is a decisive turn from idealistic formalism, from the 
attempt which Schelling's earlier thought and Hegel's system alike 
embody, viz. to grasp spirit in terms of structure. Schelling moves to 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Idealistic Studies, Vol 5, No. 1 (January 1975): pg. 20-58. DOI. This article is © Philosophy Documentation Center and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Philosophy Documentation Center 
does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express 
permission from Philosophy Documentation Center. 
3 
 
replace a logic of things as the hermeneutical tool with a logic of 
founding acts, a logic of human existence. Heidegger recognizes the 
importance of the attempt while admitting its fragile character, its 
partial success, for as a problem it is the pathfinder for serious 
thought. Schelling enunciates the question of "system," the 
togetherness of things in thought which, Heidegger claims, is what the 
ancients meant by logos. How, he asks, can freedom be contained 
within system? If reason proceeds from will and yet system is the work 
of reason, in reason, how is will comprehended? How, in the last 
analysis, is system founded or judged to be well-founded? 
 
Heidegger's 1936 lectures are cast in the form of a close 
commentary which somewhat conceals the points of his own 
philosophical attachment to Schelling. Heidegger's aim is not mere 
scholarship or a reproduction of the course of the Investigations. The 
essence of truth is in process, it carries its history along, and each 
point of that history has life and validity in the present.4 Heidegger is 
engaged in thinking with Schelling, not "thinking about." Our task will 
be to locate the essential points of confluence of their thought which 
permit this co-thinking. They are four in number: 
 
(1) Philosophic thought is systematic in essence. It is or 
represents the whole of being in its structured configuration as the 
whole. (2) The system-principle is being itself, not as revealed in 
things or in a metaphysics which grasps only the Seiendheit of beings, 
bald identity, but as an identity of the different. This identity is not one 
of sameness but of gatheredness. It is "grounding," the emergence of 
the existent from a ground, the maintenance of this manifest 
difference as their togetherness. (3) Grounding is ungrounded, there is 
no reason for reason. The meaning of grounding must therefore be 
sought humanly, in terms of will, and accordingly it appears as 
temporal process, as decision, as differentiation of good and evil. 
Along with Schelling Heidegger maintains that the meaning of 
grounding lies in freedom and so likewise does the meaning of 
"system," the "sense of being." (4) That freedom is the ultimate sense 
of grounding, which in its own right is the structuring sense or logic of 
being, implies that being is essentially finite. For freedom is always 
"thrown," necessity in its most decisive appearance, its most divisive 
appearance. Schelling emphasizes that concretely freedom is decision 
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for good and evil. Since this conditioned freedom, the place where the 
doublefold character of being breaks out as decision, is the only sense 
of grounding, grounding is always ungrounded and ab-gründig, 
abysmal. The doublefold structure of being is ambiguous. Schelling at 
this stage of the argument attempts to expunge the finitude from 
freedom and propose a ground for grounding, an absolute timelessly 
beyond the process of separating ground and existent. Heidegger must 
here reject Schelling's line of thought, and the rejection indicates the 
motives behind his rejection of metaphysics and his call for a new 
beginning in the thinking of being which would at least keep faith with 




Heidegger and Schelling both believe that philosophical thought 
is systematic in essence. System is not a mold for thought, a form 
somehow imposed on a hitherto amorphous stuff which, for all its lack 
of definition, is supposed to be "thought." System is the heart of 
thought itself. We can best convey the centrality of the notion of 
system to both thinkers if we distinguish two aspects. First, philosophy 
aims at a grasp of the whole. Not as a mere aggregate, however, but 
as a founded totality. It is a fundamental knowing, a getting down to 
foundations. In the West this quest for the fundamental took the form 
of the question of being, hence philosophy is systematic in being 
ontological. Secondly, philosophy is systematic in a peculiarly modern 
or postmodern sense. It attempts a knowing command over what is, 
that is, it tries to discover or construct the structure of being itself in 
human knowing. Hence philosophy is systematic in being a will toward 
ordering knowledge, whether one makes grandiose claims for the 
sense of things thus unearthed and calls it "the absolute" or whether 
one acknowledges the limits of an hermeneutical enterprise forever 
locked inside interpretations and preinterpretations. 
 
To bring to light their common belief in the essentially 
systematic nature of thought let us compare Schelling and Heidegger 
first as ontological thinkers, then as "systematic" philosophers in the 
narrower sense of the term spelled out above. For in our lax and 
somewhat pictorial approach to the history of thought we normally do 
not treat "absolute idealists"—commonly imagined as philosophers in 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Idealistic Studies, Vol 5, No. 1 (January 1975): pg. 20-58. DOI. This article is © Philosophy Documentation Center and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Philosophy Documentation Center 
does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express 
permission from Philosophy Documentation Center. 
5 
 
whom the will toward ordering knowing turned malignant—as 
ontological thinkers nor do we represent philosophers of existence or 
"historians of being" as systematic philosophers. 
 
Schelling came to the position that philosophy's orientation is 
ontological early in his career, at the start of the System of Identity 
and eight years prior to the Investigations. Philosophy does not occupy 
itself with the particular as such, nor is it rooted in the particularistic 
epistemic stance of subjectivity. Its object is "being in reason," the 
whole, that which is actualized in the differentiated individual, which 
realizes itself as subject and as object. Subject and object are not 
different au fond; they are instances of identity comparatively 
differentiated, thus quantitatively different (4, 123).5 It is this essential 
identity, not the differentiated particulars, which is philosophy's proper 
object. For it is, above all, comprehending knowledge, one which binds 
the individual in its independence into the universal (7, 140 f.). It is, 
says Schelling, knowledge indifferent with the absolute, the emergence 
and exhibition of the sense of the whole—in fact the "construction" of 
that whole. 
 
The being which is philosophy's object is constructible, not lying 
at hand but yet-to-be-fashioned. Its fashioning is a process of 
intermediation which Schelling calls a uniforming or invention of the 
universal and the particular. We may liken it to artistic creation, as the 
term Ineinsbildung suggests. Like those artistic processes whose 
outcome are ideas made concrete, the universe captured in individual 
form, each individual a universe (5,390), systematizing philosophic 
invention depends upon a creative prescience of sorts, "intellectual 
intuition into the absolute." By intuition into the absolute Schelling 
does not mean an access to a thing-like totality, a ready-made whole, 
for the whole and the "sense of the whole" is philosophy's work, 
necessarily a child of process and labor. He means by it rather the 
insight into the ultimate equipollence of being and thought, the 
congruence of being and thought which is the principle and the ground 
of philosophy (4,368-69). Intellectual intuition is methodological 
certainty, and receives the name "intuition" from an idealistic 
polemical stance. Intuition alone delivers the real, and the highest 
"reality" for philosophy is that congruence of being and thought which 
supplies a pattern for working the isolated and fragmented bits of 
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experienced being into a totality But why call this constructible totality 
Schelling has in mind being? Why does Heidegger explicitly point out 
Schelling as an ontological thinker? It would appear a misuse of the 
term if names name only things, and if being is a thing of sorts, albeit 
an odd thing. 
 
The question of being, insists Heidegger, is not simply a 
question of the things that are. It is a double question, the onto—
theological question. It asks after not just being as the beingly, the 
denominated being in its individuality, but after the theion, the divine 
or the ground of being, i.e., after being in its totality.6 In asking after a 
sense of the whole, then, Schelling is asking the ontological question. 
Inasmuch as the Investigations poses the question in a new way (the 
static incorporation of the individual into a structural totality, the 
position of the System of Identity, gives way to a dynamical 
totalization of being in its history) Heidegger praises it as one of the 
deepest ontological works. Its profundity, he maintains, lies in the way 
it seeks out the hidden unity of the onto—theological question and 
through the notion of the historical existence of the individual as the 
revelation of the whole links the questioning of what is as such to the 
questioning of what is in its totality. 
 
The central thrust of Heidegger's own thought is ontological; 
thought directs itself to a questioning of being, seeking the "sense of 
being" or the "truth of being" or the "essence of truth." As the plurality 
of terms indicates, the basic ontological orientation survives a number 
of tactical shifts. The questioning of being took the form first of a 
metaphysical inquiry, then that of an existential analytic of human 
experience, then that of an "antimetaphysical" history of being, and 
finally that of inquiry into truth and language. 
 
We cannot here present in detail the stable core of Heidegger's 
thought and document its ornamentation and expression from phase 
to phase. In general outline, the questioning of being turned out for 
Heidegger to be an historical dialectical search. The question of being 
is inexorably tied to being's first opening in the West, the Greek 
experience, to what was revealed there, to what was concealed, to the 
forgetfulness of the concealment. In this forgetfulness the search for 
being gets linked with the questioning of the being of beings; the 
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stable way beings have of standing in being is accepted as 
characteristic of being itself. The urge to answer the question after 
being easily and falsely by pointing out a being which is being arises 
again and again. These mistakes cannot simply be brushed aside as 
conceptually wrongheaded. For they are part of the original experience 
of being, and if there is any way to an adequate grasp of being, it 
must be a way back, won through grappling with the primal 
falsifications of the sense of being. 
 
In Heidegger's sense of the terms, a serious ontological 
philosophy is the exact opposite of a metaphysics. It is precisely 
antimetaphysical, challenging the way the question of being is 
mistakenly heard as the question of the being-ness (Seiendheit) of 
beings and mistakenly answered by the construction of an extra 
worldly source of this odd property. An ontological inquiry which 
proceeds down to the ground, which is fundamental ontology, destroys 
the dominance of beings over being and tries to lead questioning back 
to the truth of being, i.e., to the dialectic of hiddenness and clearing in 
which being happens, and back to the way truth happens, viz. 
temporally, in discrete social quanta, hence historically and finitely. 
 
For both thinkers, then, the philosophical task is to come to a 
sense of the whole through a dialectical overcoming of false 
particularistic or thing-oriented perspectives. For both philosophers the 
dialectic is internal, part of the structure of being itself, and not an 
external and merely critical tool. Schelling does not deny the truth of 
particulars, just the ultimacy of their particularity, and he attempts to 
open out their meaning until they are seen as specified functions or 
organs within the whole. Similarly Heidegger does not just point out 
the falsity of taking Seiendheit for being, but pursues the meaning of 
the falsity to its positive function as concealment of being. The "sense 
of being," or as Schelling calls it, "the absolute," is in no sense an 
alternative to the experience of things, to knowledge at its most 
everyday. Neither philosopher hopes to locate the absolute instead of 
individuals, being instead of beings. Neither Heidegger's being nor 
Schelling's absolute is available as a being. This is what Schelling's 
intellectual intuition means: there is no particularistic or thingly way of 
grasping the whole.  
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For both philosophers speculation must bring being to 
expression in thinking through the obviously or historically determined 
false. It must be the thoroughgoing refutation of the everyday and the 
commonsensical. For Schelling philosophy must think through the 
particularity of beings to their common "deep structure" and then 
proceed to think through the abstractness of this structure to its 
existential basis in the human and divine will. For Heidegger 
philosophy must rethink the historical opening of being, i.e., it must 
think through the primal concealment of concealment, the original 
falsification in this opening. It must follow the Platonic detour from 
truth as the sense of being to truth as the certainty of being,7 and 
think it through to its ground. It must break apart the Greek reification 
of the concealing-clearing doublefold of being into "idea," that which 
steadily holds itself open for sight, and deliver us over to experiencing 
the doublefold within our hedged and conditioned transcendence, in 
our freedom which is ungrounded grounding.8 
 
Many names, including that of "dialectic," could be put on this 
thinking through to the ground wherein the one-sidedness which would 
advance an aspect valid in its place to a false picture of the whole is 
conquered. Yet it is not so much the method of philosophy as its 
substance. Philosophy is ontological; it achieves the whole, wrests the 
whole from the aggregate of parts. It is onto-theological; it puts in the 
light the essential connection between questioning after the truth of 
being and questioning after a ground and wholeness for being.9 If 
philosophy achieves this wholeness by a thinking through to the 
ground, rather than calling this movement "dialectic," we might say it 
is but the negative aspect of the central act of philosophy, the fulfilling 
of the ontological difference. The ontological difference—crudely put, 
that being is not beings and beings are not being—is at the basis of all 
ontology; it grounds every metaphysics, i.e., every misguided 
ontology, as the unasked and the unexplored central question, as that 
which is most worthy of question.10 The ontological difference is that 
which is most pressingly to be thought through and, likewise, 
metaphysical neglect of the difference is that which most urgently calls 
forth the negative movement of thinking through to the ground. The 
difference between being and beings, between being and Seiendheit, is 
the crux of philosophy. Or rather, philosophy's chief task, pursued 
through all subordinate detail, is the correct drawing of this distinction, 
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the progressive differentiation—over against the muddled identification 
in the framework of the everyday—of the structure of being and the 
characteristics and properties of certain beings.11 Systematic 
philosophy, then, is the disengagement of the framework from the 
particulars placed therein, of the field of happening and its temporal 
structures from isolated acts occurring within it. 
 
We have seen that both Heidegger and Schelling are 
ontologically oriented thinkers, that they view philosophy as the 
construction or reconstruction of a sense of the whole, as an onto-
theological effort in which the crucial step is the fulfilling of the 
ontological difference, thus protecting the whole against thingly or 
particularistic interpretation. How are they systematic thinkers in that 
narrowed sense wherein "system" means will toward ordering 
knowing? 
 
An initial difficulty is that Heidegger does not seem to fall even 
roughly within the bounds of comparison. He certainly does not 
strike one as systematic in the popular sense of the term. In his 
eyes philosophy cannot pretend to completeness, formal perfection, 
and all-sided ness if a ground for that completeness, a 
comprehensiveness of intuition is lacking. We sense today the falsity of 
attempting to impart a purely formal closure to thought. Here 
Nietzsche is formative of the modern attitude. The age is the age of 
nihilism, and the will to system is always in bad faith if the problem of 
nihilism has not been solved.12 Such an attitude does not denigrate the 
notion of system as such, rather it holds it in the highest reverence. 
Nihilism is the transformation of all meanings, of the highest and 
consequently normative meaning, into "values," strange "moral 
entities"; it signals the banishing of meaning from the world. Now 
system or the ordered integration of meanings into a body of central 
meanings cannot be founded on the premises of nihilism, upon 
meanings found meaningless in themselves and forced into 
otherworldly exile. There can be no nihilistic system. 
 
We cannot call Heidegger's thought systematic, then, if we 
mean that it has the formal trappings of a finished system or that it 
heads toward conceptual' closure. If system means only completeness 
or the full set of categories for the complete range of phenomena, then 
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Heidegger's thought is radically unsystematic. But Heidegger 
continually points out that thought must be intensive before it can be 
extensive, that it must be a fundamental knowing before it can be 
comprehensive. In that Heidegger wishes to leave thought open 
toward phenomena and let them reveal the kind and degree of 
coherence of which they are capable, he might be called "systematic" 
in a sense more primitive than that of completeness and closure. His 
thought is foundational; it consistently aims at getting to the bottom of 
things, if not as metaphysics or even "fundamental ontology," then as 
a fundamental questioning. He takes completeness in listening to the 
question of being as a value inestimably higher than the elegance 
which motivates arbitrary conceptual closure. He aims not at a 
complete account of things, but at a ground-laying account which 
makes possible the coherence of phenomena and brings the integrity 
of being to the fore inasmuch as it is capable of "integrity." His 
thought is systematic in that it attempts to reach down to integrative 
forces and enunciate the first structures on the basis of which all will 
cohere, on the basis of which being can assume the completeness for 
thought of which it is capable. Its aim is logos in what Heidegger takes 
to be its pristine Heraclitean sense, the versammelnden 
Vorliegenlassen of being itself, the gathering grounding for presence 
and individuation.13 
 
It is in this spirit that Heidegger sympathetically approaches 
Schelling's investigations of the possibility of system and freedom. 
System, in its authentic sense, is the structure and integrity of being 
itself, "die wissenmässige Fügung des Gefüges und der Fuge des Seyns 
selbst."14 The taste for system in this sense—not the desire to find a 
casual framework for an aggregate at hand, but the urge to find their 
proper matrix, the framework in which they take their origin—is 
identical with the taste for the whole which we found central to 
ontological philosophy.15 
 
Heidegger's exegesis of the notion of system in post-Kantian 
idealism is quite incisive. The concept itself, he notes, is wholly a 
modern invention, a clear claim of self-certain thought over being such 
as ancient thought never witnessed. It is no coincidence that the 
central attitudinal components of the will to system are also 
determinative of the modern scientific temper, including the emphasis 
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on certainty in thought, on reason's power over what is, on man's 
ability creatively to reconstruct being through technique, through art 
and the work of genius.16 Philosophy's whole business is thus to 
become a system, a grounding and a gathering of being inside man's 
knowing. It is "the will toward a freely patterning and knowing 
ordering of being in its structure and integrity."17 
 
System is will to a knowing ordering of being, to a structure of 
thought congruent with the structure of being. Heidegger indicates 
that on such a model—and the model was operative in all of post-
Kantian idealism—philosophy has a double outreach, toward a 
coherence in knowledge and toward a comprehensive grasp of being. 
The goals do not really differ from one another: 
 
System is the structure of what is in its totality, which structure 
knows itself with absolute knowledge. This knowledge itself is 
part of "system." Knowledge constitutes the inner 
connectedness of what is. Knowledge is not, as man usually 
supposes inside the horizon of the everyday, just an occasional 
affair which from time to time stumbles upon what is. Being as 
articulated structure, as structured togetherness, and as the 
knowledge of being are one and the same—they belong 
together. Through what, then, is the structure of being 
determined? What is the law of being, and what is the mode of 
grounding of this consonance of being? What is the "principle" of 
system? What other than being itself? The question of the 
principle of system-building is the question of where the essence 
of being stands, where being has its truth. And this is the 
question of the region in which something like being can come 
generally to be revealed, how being can maintain this openness 
and maintain itself within it.18 
 
Knowledge constitutes the inner connectedness of what is, supplies the 
coherence of being. If system is the will toward coherence of 
knowledge it is eo ipso the will toward finding and preserving the 
integrity of being; it as the concern for being's openness and the 
conditions of this openness. The two aims are not different; since 
being is brought before the bench of reason for justification, it suffices 
that thought will itself as system for it to be a comprehensive grasp of 
being. System is precisely what Schelling's philosophy is about, and its 
essence, as Heidegger recognizes, lies in the richly misunderstood 
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claim that the system of philosophy is founded on and is the 
explication of "intellectual intuition." 
 
Heidegger finds the historical origin of Schelling's notion of 
system in Kant's teaching of the unitive work of reason in the 
production of "ideas." Two suppositions of the critical theory of 
knowledge kept Kant from acknowledging the validity of the will to 
system, first, that knowledge depends upon sensible experience, and, 
secondly, that what is known must necessarily be an object. Schelling 
rejects the presuppositions. System is an holistic knowledge, not 
parceled out and dependent upon representation. It is knowledge of 
the whole, thus nonobjective, not thingly or reified. Heidegger seems 
to appreciate how free of the model of the thing Schelling's ideal of 
philosophical knowledge is. It is intuition into being which comes to 
itself inside of philosophical inquiry. It is not knowledge of a being, but 
a progressive and self-won achievement of a sense of the whole. Of 
the nature and task of the philosophical system Schelling had said, 
"One cannot describe reason, it must describe itself in everything and 
through everything" (7, 146). Heidegger, in comment on this 
systematizing knowledge, reveals the ontological impulse in the will to 
system or intellectual intuition: 
 
This non-object-oriented knowing of what is as a whole 
recognizes itself as the authentic or absolute mode of 
knowledge. What it pushes on to know is none other than the 
structure of being which no longer opposes itself to knowing as 
an object of some sort, but comes to itself in the knowing. This 
becoming and coming into itself is absolute being.19 
 
System pushes beyond knowledge of objects at hand into a process of 
knowing which is fundamental in the full sense of the word, self-
founding. Our being and being as such are implicated in this process; 
their togetherness is at once the basis of the systematic knowing and 
its outcome. System is thus the work of spirit, of human knowing in its 
gathering power, functioning as eros. Spirit finds and founds the sense 
of the whole in coming to itself: this is the central doctrine of the 
Investigations and the one point where Heidegger's philosophical 
sympathy for Schelling is firmly anchored. The philosophical moment, 
maintains Heidegger, lies not in any mechanical progression of 
thought, whether analytical or synthetical, but in a leap in thought 
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away from beings and their seemingly static Seinendheit to the "play" 
of being wherein our human existence is located, the "play" in which 
man is used, set in play, remains in the play, and in which being itself 
plays and delivers being and grounding over to us.20 The fundamental 
question for philosophy is not how far it can explain, but the perfection 
and integrity of its will to explain. One asks of thought not how 
"comprehensive" it is, but how deeply it is founded in the workings of 
spirit, how perfect it is in its coming to itself in the play of being, how 
perfect its will to system. For after all explaining is done "the question 
remains whether and how we who attend to the moves of this play, 
play along with it and gather ourselves in the play."21 
 
Heidegger thus agrees with Schelling that thought is in essence 
systematic, both in its ontological direction, its impulse toward 
disengaging the structure of being as a whole, and in its commitment 
to "system," the will that being be captured in an ordering knowing 
and reveal itself as essentially involved in that process. In this 
agreement it might seem that Heidegger endorses the program of an 
absolute idealism. This is far from true. Whatever else one makes of 
Heidegger's rather obscure pronouncements on being, one does not 
get the sense that he thinks all being in principle graspable. It is 
graspable only inasmuch as it is elusive; its whole availability for 
thought is in the dialectic of hiddenness and clearing. 
 
Absolute idealism is, for Heidegger, part of the history of 
metaphysics, that is, it belongs to the tradition that has forgotten 
being inasmuch as it has consistently forgotten the moment of being's 
hiddenness. It is not as an absolute idealist that Heidegger values 
Schelling, certainly not as the creator of a paper system, a closed 
Euclidean deduction of all being. His affinity with Schelling lies in a 
common view of systematic philosophy as will to system, as a process 
in which the philosopher and his audience are engaged, a process 
which alone can convey the doublefold character of being, the tension 
between its availability for thought and its elusiveness. Heidegger 
values Schelling because he understood system as the work of spirit, 
as the product of man concernfully engaged in the roots of his being. 
We must understand that it is neither the author of the System of 
Identity who attracts Heidegger nor the Schelling of the later positive 
philosophy, with its emphasis on divine transcendence, but the author 
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of the Investigations on Human Freedom, the "anthropomorphic" 
approach to system which takes human transcendence as the key to 
being's structure and integrity. 
 
Schelling's earlier thought was systematic only in an abstract 
and structural manner. The central element of system, the impulse of 
self-certain thought to bring forth the structure of the whole, was 
there conceived as the work of disembodied intelligence, timeless and 
impartial, rather than as the work of spirit bound into time and history. 
The possibility of coming to a sense of the whole was thought to 
depend upon a transcendence of the perspectival character of our 
knowing, upon an "abstraction from subjectivity" (6, 142-43). Being 
was conceived as a nondifference of subjectivity and objectivity; for 
philosophy to attain this supporting medium for both thingly being and 
human subjectivity, it must renounce the place of the subject for an 
indifferent state of knowing. Systematic philosophy must presume a 
congruence between its knowledge and the whole, and this congruence 
dictates its basic logic and mode of investigation. Philosophy's most 
basic thought is the equivalence of knowing and being; the structure 
of this equivalence determines all the further reaches of that thought. 
In the System of Identity, then, all being was captured as structure, as 
a quantitative tensing of the fundamental equipollence of subjectivity 
and objectivity. Prior to the Investigations we might say that 
Schelling's grasp on being is purely logical. 
 
The essay on freedom marks a new stage, the removal of the 
basis of system from a mathematicized nature to spirit, an attempt to 
come to the whole not only in terms of structure but in human terms, 
in terms of will. This is, as Heidegger points out, an anthropomorphic 
approach, but it remains an approach to system, to a thought-
gathered structure of being. Such an approach, which Schelling calls 
"comprehending the god outside oneself through the god within" (7, 
337), places human action, reasoning or knowing will at the basis of 
its concern for the total grasp of being. As Schelling expressed it in an 
1811 manuscript: 
 
Created out of the source of things and kindred to it, the human 
soul has a conscience of the creation. In it lies the greatest 
clarity of all things and it is not so much knowing as it is itself 
science.22 
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System is to be founded in man's essence. The Investigations is so 
taken up with this program that there is little explicit discussion of 
what system means. Schelling's concern is how will can be made 
central to system, even its foundation. Only through a thinking 
appropriation of the complex dependence-independence relation 
involved in human freedom can the togetherness of man and nature, 
nature and God, and man and God be formulated—and the temporal 
character of their interdevelopment. 
 
Heidegger finds himself attracted, then, to this anthropomorphic 
attempt at system, to Schelling's effort to conoeive being and human 
being as process, to conceive the underlying structure of being not in 
terms of spatial inherence but in terms of temporal development, 
differentiation within unity. And it is not just the similarity to his own 
project of a fundamental ontology based on an analytic of Dasein that 
attracts Heidegger's attention, but the way that Schelling almost 
transcends the limitations of metaphysics in posing the question of 
grounding. This almost-transcendence interests Heidegger both in its 
positive and negative aspects. As we shall later see, Schelling's 
attempt to think the groundlessness of being into a transcendent 
ground of some sort, an indifferent absolute, is for Heidegger one of 
the crucial repetitions of the "metaphysical" falsification of being, the 
forgetting of its hiddenness, the consequent distortion of its 




The whole course of Heidegger's thought might be described as 
an attempt to think through the question of being without the 
presuppositions which have made that thinking "metaphysical," 
namely, that the thing is the paradigm existent and that its being, 
unchanging presence or strict identity despite change, is characteristic 
of being itself. The metaphysical way of thinking is nihilistic, world-
destroying; in seeking for a being which is timelessly evident and self-
present, metaphysics ejects being as a process of bringing truth to 
light and concealing it from the "real world." Truth, maintains 
Heidegger, is happening, covering-uncovering, an interplay of man and 
world, the contingent and fragile outcome of the interworkings of the 
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fourfold, of earth and world, of the divine and the mortal.23 Truth is a 
worldly occurrence, being is radically finite and incomplete. This is 
what metaphysics time and again forgets in thinking being as steady 
presence, as a permanent holding itself in the open, free from the 
counterweight of a hiddenness ever seeking to enclose. 
 
Both Heidegger and Schelling see the West's understanding of 
being as mediated through its understanding of the copula, the "is" of 
the judgment. Metaphysical thinking finds the copula enunciating the 
same kind of unspecified, atemporal, fully symmetrical identity which 
the mathematical equation sign signifies. It says: Being is sameness, a 
timeless ground in which the "states" of a "being" are interchangeable, 
within which, fundamentally, nothing ever happens to what is. The 
detemporalizing of being worked by this understanding of identity 
distorts the worldly character of being. If we consider identity as a 
character of being, not as the sameness typical of the Seiendheit of 
beings, we find it is happening, the context of the togetherness of 
being and man, of the way they mutually call ~ach other out. Identity 
is a belonging together, with the emphasis on belonging. Far from 
being abstract sameness, it is a fragile togetherness based, as it were, 
upon acts of will, upon call and response.24 
 
To think through being in a nonmetaphysical way, Heidegger 
must find a way of enunciating being in its event character and avoid 
the sterile logic of thing-identity which underlies Western metaphysics. 
One way to do this is to work upon language itself, to exploit the 
kinship of poetry and thought, to force language into naming the 
fragile situations in which man and world as different bearers of being 
interplay. Another way is to work upon inherited metaphysical 
language itself, exploiting the possibilities as yet not thoroughly 
integrated into the everyday sense of being as object. For this second 
task a logic of difference or progressive differentiation must be 
developed, a logic which adopts as its primitive sense-making 
operation not identification across change, but change and 
differentiation across nominal identity or continuity. Heidegger finds 
the key to this logic in Schelling's notion of grounding, in his proposal 
that the basic sense of being is not self-enclosed identity but 
emergence from a ground itself ungrounded. Heidegger's central 
ontological terminology, widely used beyond the Schelling lectures, 
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indicates his debt to the latter philosopher, e.g., being as a "ground" 
which is "ungrounded," as the "primal ground" or reason for that which 
is itself groundless, the "Abgrund" or abyss.25 
 
The Investigations is a system of grounding, an attempt to 
fashion a "sense of the whole" on the model of emergence or 
progressive differentiation. Now part of the task of system, the 
"theological" part of the onto-theological project, is thought's discovery 
of a ground for the coherence of being into a whole. For there to be 
system, being must be thought in a ground which gives wholeness and 
integrity, a the ion. What is crucial here is how this theion grounds, or 
in what sense being is "in" a ground. Against Spinoza, Schelling 
remarks that his fault lies not in conceiving all things as inhering in 
God, but in conceiving them all as things, consequently in thinking 
their inherence in the ground as spatial containedness (7, 349). The 
Investigations demands that we think being from the model of human 
being, from the experience of human freedom. How is being as 
experienced in freedom grounded? We do not feel ourselves placed, 
containerized. Freedom reveals not only the passive dependency we 
normally associate with inhering in a ground, but the active autonomy 
of selfhood. Hence the kind of grounding in the theion which the 
system of freedom must have as its basic thought must be complex; it 
must be a thinking through of the complex dependence-independence 
which the Christian stories of creation represent. God (in the 
ontological, not the theistic sense) must be conceived not only as a 
ground of beings in their dependence but as a ground of their 
independence. 
 
Thus the ground of being must ground not only the moment of 
inherence in the ground, the moment of wholeness, but also that of 
differentiation, the individuation of the whole. The ground of being in 
Schelling's system of freedom is not an inert measure of sameness, a 
kind of platinum bar for identity, but a ground for difference. The 
togetherness of being as a whole is established not by a simple being-
in-a-ground, but by individuated beings proceeding from the ground or 
being. Beings not only inhere in a ground, they are out of the ground, 
they are grounded, establish their selves by differentiation from a 
containing ground. 
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The experience of freedom indicates that man is independent of 
the ground upon which he depends, that man's being is his own doing 
in spite of his dependent origin (7, 385). Man's independence of his 
ground indicates for Schelling that the grounding of the ground or the 
theion must be a process of coherent (thus structuring) differentiation. 
Grounding is not simple containedness or having a place, it is 
differentiation from the ground, emergence out of the ground. 
Grounding thus splits into two moments, the ground or basis and the 
existent, that which has emerged from the ground. What connects the 
two moments is not the passive identification of spatial inherence, but 
temporal differentiation, becoming. 
 
The possibility of a system of freedom rests on this notion of 
grounding, the emergence of the existent from the ground. On the 
basis of his differentiation from the ground of being, man, the 
togetherness of being and thought, exists, and on the basis of this 
existence the ground or theion has its actuality and is progressively 
actualized. Being comes into wholeness in a progressive and dynamic 
togetherness achieved through differentiation, through the separation 
of ground and existent in man. Man's freedom (Entscheidung) is the 
place where this differentiation (Scheidung) of principles takes place; 
consequently it is the locus of the structuring or gathering of being—
themes close to Heidegger's formulations of the reciprocal interplay of 
being and Dasein. 
 
It is rather too much to hope that a thumbnail sketch of the 
system of freedom will seem cogent upon first reading. To see 
philosophically how the logical character of grounding as differentiation 
passes over into a cosmological process of the separation of the dual 
principles (basis and existent) in which human decision plays the key 
role we must look more closely into the logic of grounding Schelling 
proposes, first investigating how it situates the experience of human 
freedom and solves traditional objections to the possibility of freedom, 
and secondly searching into its ontological presuppositions, viz. that 
being is will. 
 
The task of founding the philosophical system upon the 
experience of freedom posed for Schelling the challenge of adjusting 
ontology to the complex situation of independence-dependency. It 
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demanded the rethinking of the problem of pantheism, more pointedly, 
the rethinking of the concepts of identity and being expressed in the 
"is" of "God is all," taken as an expression of the inherence of all in a 
unifying ground. The complexity of freedom forbids any static 
formulation of this inherence; the nonsensical nature of all 
interpretations of the pantheistic statement in terms of abstract 
identity forces Schelling to conceive inherence in a dynamic fashion, as 
inherence across a definite and unbridgeable difference. Since freedom 
is the model of being, grounding must be a structure of thrusting-forth 
and gathering-back, and the identity which the copula expresses in 
"God is all" must be an identity of antecedent and consequent. The 
relation indicated by the "is" is one of emergence and outcome. As 
illustrations of this sense of identity Schelling offers these statements, 
"The perfect is the imperfect" and "The good is the evil," both of which 
indicate that the subject term is prior to, and in fact the essential 
component in the predicate, which is a modification or redirection of 
the subject's essential activity. Identity in these instances is a case of 
grounding, the identity at the basis of each being whereby it is a 
being, i.e., whereby it divides into ground and existence. The ground 
component is that which remains behind and, as it were, under as a 
physical basis, while the existent component goes forth from the 
ground in revealing itself, i.e., revealing what in the basis is hidden.26 
This processive identity-in-differentiation, the togetherness of ground 
and existent, neither component logically or temporally prior to the 
other, is what Heidegger simply calls the Seynsfuge, the structure of 
being.27 
 
Every being has a ground out of which it exists. Schelling's 
logical solution to the problem of reconciling freedom and system, of 
correctly delimiting the interplay of independence and dependence, is 
to locate man in God's basis or ground, nature. Man inheres in or 
depends upon God's ground, upon that which is God inasmuch as it is 
God's ground, but which is not strictly to be identified with God, who 
as existent and personal has gone forth from this ground. Man is 
independent of the existent God—thus his being is "his own deed"—
while inhering in God's ground. Schelling thus achieves a purely formal 
notion of freedom: Man is "in God" and yet "free" since he pertains to 
the basis. The basis is "in God"—since there can be nothing outside 
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God—and yet it is not God, for the essence of every being (God 
included) consists in difference, a difference of ground and existence. 
 
Formulated in such high abstraction, the ontological divergence 
between ground and what exists as grounded furnishes only a 
negative concept of freedom. Man is "left free," exempted from the 
control or overwhelming determination of God, since he is contained in 
God's ground. "The real and vital conception of freedom," however, "is 
that it is a possibility of good and evil" (7, 352). This negative freedom 
does not really establish its own possibility either, but pushes all the 
problems of pantheism back one step where they arise once more, 
now in relation to God's basis rather than his personal existence. And 
finally the question arises of why God is subjected to the Seynsfuge, 
why not only beings but the theion or ground of being should be 
characterized by the split of existence from ground. 
 
It is only when being is grasped as will, says Schelling, that the 
true notion of freedom as decision, the division of good and evil, 
comes to light. Only when the highest ground of being is seen as will 
and not self-enclosed identity does the differential structure of being 
become meaningful. 
 
In the final and highest instance there is no other being than 
Will. Will is primordial Being, and all predicates apply to it 
alone—groundlessness, eternity, independence of time, self-
affirmation. All philosophy strives only to find this highest 
expression (7, 350). 
 
Abstract structural formulations do not reach down to the essence. 
Being is "will," but "will" itself is an abstract expression. Brought, as 
Schelling would say, closer to the human, interpreted in terms of our 
experience, being is process, development through differentiation. 
"Being is only aware of itself in becoming ... All history remains 
incomprehensible without the concept of a humanly suffering God" (7, 
403). 
 
Grounding, then, is not a static difference of two components, 
but their progressive differentiation, the emergence of the existent out 
of the ground. Time is the sense of this differentiation; its continuity 
gathers the different back together. And yet, as we shall see, it is not 
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just a uniform mechanical passage of events that establishes 
continuity and gatheredness, but the temporally processive work of 
spirit, the actualization of will as eros, the binding of the separate and 
disparate. That the articulated system of beings, the togetherness- 
through-differentiation, is not a matter of abstract structure but is the 
logos enunciated by finite spirit is the new element in Schelling's 
speculations in 1809 and the point of Heidegger's convergence in that 
line of thought. For Schelling man is the locus of divinization, of the 
emergence of the divine from the ground of nature as spirit, the power 
of binding basis and existent, just as for Heidegger man is the place 
where the earth "worlds," where the divine shows itself in the finite, 
fragmented and deathridden creature whose "destiny" is to suffer 
being. 
 
The Investigations leaves much unclear about the relation of 
God and man, for example, whether the divine exists over and against 
the humanly revealed divine, whether being is still conceived, in 
consonance with the metaphysical tradition, as a being, the highest of 
beings. The single-minded direction of Schelling's later thought toward 
establishing the existence of a transcendent God leaves little doubt 
about the tendency of Schelling's thought as a whole. Heidegger, 
however, attaches himself only to the Schelling of 1809, the man, he 
claims, who for the first time entered into dialogue with Leibniz on the 
full significance of the concept of ground,28 who captured being as a 
doublefold structure of grounding and refused to think its doubleness 
away into a singular being, into Cartesian substance, the self-
grounding. For the Schelling of the Investigations God and man are 
inexorably intertwined in a dialectic of revelation. Neither term of this 
dialectic has meaning on its own, neither God nor man, and neither 
has at its own disposal, so to speak, the meaning of being. Their 
interplay is revelation, i.e., progressive separation of differentiation, 
progressive establishment of the Seynsfuge. 
 
Emergence or separation from the basis and the eventual 
binding of the fully separated basis back into the existent as the 
fulfillment of the process are, on God's part, delivered over to man's 
spirit, to his decision, to his ultimately contingent and fragile binding. 
Read ontologically, as it should be, this cosmological scenario indicates 
that being is revealed only in spiritual beings, beings capable of 
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appropriating the doublefold structure of being-ground-existence or, in 
its human meaning, good and evil—and effecting the actual 
differentiation. The separation of basis and existent and their 
subsequent binding or union in spirit is "absolute in God, but 
actualized in man." Only through the finite and temporal binding of 
ground and existent in man does the emergence out of the ground 
take place, i.e., the ultimate elevation of will as impulse into reason or 
spiritual selfhood. Man alone is the place of decision, of differentiation, 
of revelation or the establishment of difference. Man is the place where 
the grounding character of being can break into the open, and 
"grounding" is only a convenient way of saying that identity or 
togetherness of being must be founded through differentiation. Man is 
the point of difference where the structure of being establishes itself, 
the difference of good and evil, of ground and consequent, of being as 
ground and of being as existent, i.e., as beings. This is the central 
point of the system of freedom, as this schematic passage indicates: 
 
If God as spirit is the indivisible unity of the two principles 
[ground and existent] and this same unity is actual only in 
man's spirit, then if it were just as indissoluble in him as in God, 
man could not be distinguished from God at all; he would 
disappear in God and there would be no revelation and no 
stirring of love. For every nature can be revealed only in its 
opposite—love in hatred, unity in strife. If there were no division 
of the principles unity could not manifest its omnipotence; if 
there were no conflict love could not become real. Man has been 
placed on that summit where he contains within him the source 
of self-impulsion toward good and evil in equal measure; the 
nexus of principles within him is not a bond of necessity but of 
freedom. He stands at the dividing line; whatever he chooses 
will be his act, but he cannot remain in indecision because God 
must necessarily reveal himself and because nothing at all in 




To this point we have explored how Schelling's system of 
freedom demands that being be conceived as progressive grounding or 
differentiation and noted how, generally, the doublefold structure of 
grounding must be conceived in terms of process, becoming, or being 
as will. We must now go to the central point, that the progressive 
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differentiation of ground and existence which frames the structure of 
being is not an abstract cosmological process but a human work, the 
accomplishment of spirit. For Heidegger's adoption of Schelling's 
notions of grounding and emergence from the ground may signal little 
more than a casual eclecticism if the two philosophers are not in 
agreement that it is man's privilege to frame the structure of being 
while standing in it and that this structure is possible only through the 
unitive work of spirit. We must see how human freedom founds 
system, how man's resolute standing in being brings forth the 
articulated wholeness of the world's meaning, how, in Heidegger's 
words, "freedom is the ground of grounding."29 Since Heidegger puts 
his own explanation of this "freedom" in terms borrowed from 
Schelling, e.g., freedom as ultimate ground is Abgrund or unground, 
we must plunge further into the most complex parts of the 
Investigations. 
 
The separation and the binding together of the two principles in 
the structure of being, in simpler terms the bringing of what is to 
system, depends on man's decision for good and evil. Schelling wants 
to establish freedom as the "reason" or ultimate meaning for that 
framework of grounding within which alone something can be 
"reasonable" or maintain its meaning. Yet freedom in the negative 
sense, as being left free from divine determination, is possible only 
because the twofold split of ground and existence has already opened, 
because man inheres in God's ground or nature. How can this circle be 
explained? How can freedom as decision for good and evil ground 
grounding and yet depend upon that very structure? 
 
There are two main senses of "freedom" in play in the 
Investigations, the negative or Cartesian sense of being exempted 
from influences and left free to act, and what Schelling calls the "true 
concept of freedom," the possibility of good and evil (7, 352). (The 
"true" concept, it should be noted, does not involve choice or acting, 
but refers only to the outbreak of double possibilities. "Good" and 
"evil" are ontological poles, not mere moral qualities.) There are also, 
we recall, two senses of "grounding," the abstract one wherein ground 
and what is grounded are conceived as simply different, and the truer 
dynamic conception, based on the insight that being is essentially will, 
wherein ground and existence are differentiated into clearly different 
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entities only through the process of emergence from the ground. The 
two senses of freedom correlate with the two senses of grounding. 
Abstractly freedom is simply inherence in a ground different from the 
divine. Dynamically, however, freedom is a process of dividing 
existence from the ground, a process of establishing the double 
possibilities "good" and "evil," a process of man as spirit emerging out 
of God's ground or nature. And just as grounding statically conceived 
made sense only with the introduction of the dynamic sense, the idea 
of grounding as emergence, so the static sense of freedom first 
becomes meaningful in the light of the dynamic. Only because man 
divides existence from ground (and binds them as spirit) in emerging 
from nature is he left free from God's domination, i.e., from that of 
Spinozistic "nature" (the ground) and from that of the personal God 
(existent). 
 
Schelling conceives human ways of being as constitutive of 
being itself, as determinative of its fundamental structure or meaning. 
Differentiation and reunification, individuation and "binding" (spirit's 
gathering into a whole), in more human terms, the choice of self and 
the choice of community, are all processes in being itself. They 
establish the Seynsfuge of ground and existent, nature and the divine. 
Primally being is will; its highest possibility—the revelation of God—is 
spirit and its unitive work in eros, the binding together of such things 
as are capable of existing without each other (7, 408), or as Heidegger 
would express it, that gathering into a unity or towards a self which 
the ancients called logos.30 The history of being necessarily involves 
division, separation, individuation, for the gathering worked by spirit in 
eros, the revelatory speaking out of the hidden unity, is possible only 
across the greatest difference, across the greatest resistance. In man 
this gathering—speaking appears most decisively as freedom, the 
possibility of good and evil, the necessity for decision and separation. 
 
But how is the decision for good and evil the division of ground 
and existent? How does freedom, on any definition, determine the 
structure of being? Schelling's answer is simple: The unity of spirit, the 
fragile and dissoluble union of the double possibilities, of good and 
evil, of selfhood as universal will and selfhood as individuality, of will 
as rationality and will as impulse: this unity is the structure of being, 
and not only its structure but its history. Systematic philosophy thus 
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becomes a natural history of spirit, in Schelling's terms, a philosophy 
of the creation. Man's spiritual character is not factual; it is not 
explained by man's being an instance of being inside the decisive-
unitive Seynsfuge. Rather it is active and historical; the doublefold 
structure of being is established only in man's progressive decision, his 
adoption of self-enclosed, self-grounded existence as one possibility 
and a gathering communicative type of existence as the other. 
 
Man is decisive for being, divisive and integrative within being, 
because he carries the history of being, because starting within nature, 
a creature of the ground, he has become spirit. Starting as negatively 
free or sheltering in the ground he has become the willed and 
intelligent unity of that ground and of his present being. Man as spirit 
is at once the product and the bearer of the history of being. Schelling 
calls him the spiritualization of the ground, the revelation of the divine 
in nature, of the godly light hidden in the depths. Declining to alter the 
anthropocentric approach in any way and think nature and spirit as 
radically different types of being, Schelling insists that they differ only 
according to the pattern of emergence of the Seynsfuge. Man is central 
to the whole creation, he maintains, that is, the creation has taken 
place within man's being and in its culmination brings his spirituality to 
light as the meaning of being. Man's creation or coming into being has 
been the history of nature, its transformation from chaos to stable and 
individuated existence. Likewise the history of nature has been the 
emergence of man as spirit, the transformation of blind impulse into 
logos (7, 360-61). Man's being is thus the historical framing of the 
structure of being. He takes his rise in the ground, in the primal will-
state Schelling pictures as impulse and yearning, and has become 
spirit, will operative as reason and love. And as the spiritualization of 
the ground and the ordering of nature man is ever more sharply the 
division of ground and existent, of individuality and community. 
 
The progressive differentiation which structures being is a 
division worked out over history, reaching its full development in 
man's choice of his self, the double possibility of "good" and "evil" 
which Schelling visualizes as the possibility of individual existence, of 
selfhood. Man as individuated—Heidegger would say "thrown" 
existence has come out of the central ground, out of the generality of 
will, and in his individuality he clearly and finally divides ground (the 
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general) and existence (the individual). This is the final division. 
Throughout the process of being—first as a cosmological development, 
then as an historical one—the division has been one of knowing will. 
But once the division is accomplished and man stands out in his 
individuality the division explicitly becomes decision, decision about 
individuality, about selfhood. 
 
Within man's spirituality, we might say, the cosmological 
process of division is interiorized. He is placed at the dividing line, the 
point where everything as yet ambiguous and undecided about being 
will be revealed in his decision (7, 374). 
 
The decision is about individuality, about the possibilities opened 
up for the tenuous state of individuation which the cosmological and 
historical dialectic of impulse and reason has brought to light. The 
decision is the possibility of good and evil, of the unification of 
individuality with the generality of nature which is spirit and of self-
enclosed individuality, self-will. In his interpretation of the 
Investigations, Heidegger emphasizes that this freedom or decisive 
setting apart of the two principles of the ontological framework is 
indeed the possibility of good and evil. It is the outbreak of a double 
possibility, not a division of good and evil as a decision for good and 
against evil, but a decision for good and evil. The decision for selfhood 
which is freedom's essence is evidently not a choice of one kind of 
selfhood as opposed to another; such choices are ontic possibilities for 
selves, but we are concerned here with a decision which opens up the 
very ontological structure of selfhood. The "good" and "evil" whose 
possibility founds the structure of being are not moral qualities, but 
the fixed double possibility of being itself, polar opposites whose 
polarity cannot be thought away or suppressed, even by choosing one 
over the other. Thus Heidegger remarks that the emergence of "evil" 
in human existence is at the same time the emergence of "good." The 
selfhood chosen by man in his essence, ontologically decided then, is 
the dialectic of individuality itself, the possibility of self-enclosed 
existence and of existence in community with the ground from which 
he takes his rise (7, 364-65). Neither possibility can be eliminated, 
and were one to be left behind, selfhood would perish and being would 
be sterile and lifeless, revealing nothing. 
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Why should Schelling conceive selfhood, particularly the 
spiritualized selfhood of freedom, to be so tenuous, so delicate a thing 
that its very essence is a double opposition of tendencies, the 
possibility of good and evil? We have seen that spirit is an historical-
cosmological product, the outcome of the division of principles in 
nature and a transformation of that division into decision. The unity of 
principles which man is is inherited from nature; spirit is a unity of 
factors implicitly united in the ground but which could not there attain 
unification and which were in need of differentiation through 
emergence from the ground. Spirit, then, is the selfhood of the ground 
made over, it is the self-seeking and self-enclosure of impulse changed 
into a unity which gathers difference, into love. "It is will beholding 
itself in complete freedom, no longer the tool of the universal will 
operating in nature, but above and outside all nature" (7, 364). There 
is the key. Man as spirit is the self-seeking of the ground gone out 
from the ground, thus the definitive division of ground and existent 
which yet holds them together into a structure. The history of nature is 
this act of emergence from the ground and man in his capacity as 
spirit is this fundamental act of being raised to consciousness. Now the 
whole sense of man's spirituality lies in his having emerged from the 
ground, gone out from nature. Thus his spirituality is ever conditioned 
and fragile since it is, in its first instance, the ground's own impUlsive 
self-seeking distanced from itself. If spirit's highest possibility, the 
gatheredness of love and reason, is the selfbood of the ground 
transformed, it is in basis identical with' the self-will of the ground, 
and part of its very essence will be the constant solicitation to return 
to the ground. 
 
Spirit is of its essence conditioned and tenuous. It is a dynamic 
union of opposing possibilities, more of the nature of a balance than of 
physical solidification. Thus man's decision is about selfhood, about the 
dual possibilities of selfhood as self-enclosure and selfhood as a 
gathering thrusting-forth of being in its diversity. Spiritualized selfhood 
can forget itself and return to the ground, i.e., it can forget that it is 
spirit off of the basis of the ground and attempt to be spirit in a self-
grounded and self-seeking manner. This is evil, that "self-will may 
seek to be, as a particular will, that which it is only in its identity with 
the universal will" (7, 365). 
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For Schelling evil means that man can take his life without 
regard for the ground from whence it arose, that as spirit he can 
attempt to be spirit without regard for nature and his history in nature, 
that, in theological terms, man can seize his independence as spirit 
while forgetting the creaturely basis of that independence. In 
ontological terms this "evil" is the possibility of the collapse of the 
structure of being itself, the possibility of senselessness. Since the 
gathering and uniting sense of all that is depends upon the progressive 
emergence or grounding which nature has undergone and which 
comes to itself knowingly in man's capacity as spirit, the forgetfulness 
of the ground which is one of spirit's fundamental possibilities for 
selfhood signals the persistent possibility of senselessness, the 
collapse of the Seynsfuge. Freedom is the possibility of good and evil. 
Spirit establishes itself tenuously as a dialectic of differing possibilities 
of selfhood, self-enclosing impulse on one hand, world-gathering 
reason on the other. Spirit establishes the sense of being, the 
structure of the whole, only contingently, temporally, never in some 
timeless and absolute manner. 
 
How does Heidegger concur with this analysis of freedom 
establishing the sense of grounding, of man in his decision framing the 
structures of being's coherence? He is deeply sympathetic to 
Schelling's thesis that man's spirituality is in its ontological basis 
historical, a process implicated in articulating nature into world. Man 
has historically become the decision place in being, a "clearing" where 
the doublefold or ground-existent structure of being comes to 
expression. Yet this locus of expression is being's most fragile point; 
the principles Schelling supposed absolutely united in God are bound 
only contingently in man by the finite and temporal act of spirit. 
Human freedom is decision for good and evil, the standing possibility 
of both the maintenance of the structure of being and of its collapse. 
As the clearing for being, man is radically limited, and the sense of 
being which can emerge from his spirituality, from his historical 
standing in being as a gathering place, is similarly limited. Man stands 
in being tenuously and gathers tenuously. Schelling does not maintain 
that man simply is spirit; he has become spirit and that spirituality 
involves a constant solicitation to misinterpret his being, to miss the 
meaning of spirit. For Heidegger man's authentic standing in being or 
listening to being is only one pole of his possibilities as Dasein, the 
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other of which is the mechanical and object-like life of the everyday. 
The sense of being which can emerge from man's fragile standing in 
being is as finite as man's spirituality itself. Being itself is as fragile as 
the web of opposed possibilities Dasein reveals, insists Heidegger. In 
its clearing it shows itself as clearing-and-hiddenness. 
 
I would suggest that what Schelling indicates in making man the 
place of decision for being, the standing possibility of good and evil, is 
what Heidegger wants to convey by the dialectic of hiddenness and 
clearing within being, that dialectic which enables metaphysics to 
cover over the moment of hiddenness and reduce the dynamic tension 
of being to the solidified openness of the thing. Man's decision is the 
systematizing of being, the outbreak of the double possibilities which 
are his response to the call of the ground and the revelation of the 
final meaning of that ground. Schelling's notion of decision, the 
emergence of the differentiated being-structure from the originally 
undifferentiated ground, is akin to what Heidegger calls man's listening 
to conscience, the response of the mortal to the divine whereby man 
finitely and in thrown fashion makes a world or allows the world to 
world around him.31 This systematizing of being which man effects or 
the world he occasions around him is a radically finite structure, a 
"situation" rather than a "thing." Being itself is a tension; it has deep 
within it a cleft, a fault, an inner dialectic which comes to expression in 
the thrownness of freedom. Being, says Heidegger, is something to be 
suffered: ". . . only the finite existent has the privilege and the pain of 
standing within being as such and experiencing the true as what is."32 
Schelling maintains that even the theion, the divine itself, suffers 
being, suffers from being's internal wound or finitude: 
 
All existence must be conditioned [i.e., grounded] in order that 
it may be actual, that is, personal existence ... This is the 
sadness which adheres to all finite life, and inasmuch as there is 
even in God himself a condition at least relatively independent, 
there is in him too a source of sadness (7, 399). 
 
Comparisons such as the above can be drawn between 
Heidegger and Schelling but what is of more interest and importance is 
the parallel Heidegger himself proposes between the Investigations 
and his own thought, namely, between Schelling's sense of freedom as 
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decision (Entschiedenheit) and his own notion of authentic existence 
as anticipatory resolve (Entschlossenheit). 
 
According to Schelling man is in essence decisive. This means 
not that he has choices ahead of himself to make but that he has 
already fundamentally chosen himself. At issue in freedom is not any 
particular ontic choice, but the constitutive choice of selfhood. Man is a 
revelation of the decision in being, the doublefold unity of ground and 
existent. Man is in freedom, he dwells in the decision. Hence his 
existence is characterized not so much by having choices yet to make, 
but in having to live out a prior decision for selfhood. In commentary 
on this reading of freedom Heidegger adds: 
 
This essence [of man] must, in accord with the origin of man 
from out of the life-glance of the divine ground, have been 
determined from eternity, and in fact, since the essence of man 
is always an individual, it must consist in the eternal 
determination of itself to its self. The characteristic essence of 
every man is always his own eternal act. Thence that feeling, at 
once uncanny and gratifying, that we have always been who we 
are, that we are nothing other than the uncovering of things 
long ago decided.33 
 
The self-choice or spiritualization of will wherein man essentially 
consists is not so much active choice of selfhood as the acting out of 
selfhood already, in contingent or thrown fashion, chosen. As 
Heidegger interprets Schelling, then, the decisiveness of human 
freedom is a taking one's place in history. Deciding one's self is not the 
bundling together of fragmentary introspective acts into a null point of 
unity, but rather resolve, a standing in the openness of truth and 
history. Commenting on Schelling's interpretation of freedom as 
decision for good and evil, Heidegger says, 
 
Within decision toward one's inmost essence it will be found that 
no one reaches the peak of his good nor the depths of his evil 
(7, 433), but that he is placed in this in-between to work out his 
truth, which is in itself necessary, but for just that reason 
historical .... An achieved truth alone is truth, for it wrests the 
being into the open, prepares the way for the binding of beings 
to come into play.34 
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How does this decisiveness which Heidegger says is in its true 
state only as resolve compare to the anticipatory resolve of Sein und 
Zeit? There resolve was described as the choice of the choice of 
selfhood (270), as preparedness for anxiety or projection into guilt 
(297, 301), most fundamentally as a comprehending being-toward- 
death (305). Resolve is Dasein's appropriation of the dialectic of self-
gatheredness and thrownness in selfhood. It is anticipatory living 
under death, a fashioning of a self-understanding in terms of 
mortality, the general situation for man (382). It is a freedom to give 
oneself over to one's place, one's situation, a situation which places 
the individual by the way it compels his interest and limits his activity. 
Resolve is man's recognition of his radical finitude, a recognition of 
how his own being as spirit appears only within the structures of 
finitude, viz. time, death, the "nothing" of consciousness. 
 
There appears to be little difference, ultimately, between the 
decisiveness which Heidegger discovers in Schelling's thought (and 
which he wishes to push into the foreground in his interpretation of the 
Investigations) and the anticipatory resolve of Sein und Zeit. They are 
figuratively different ways of indicating the same thing, man's radical 
finitude and the corresponding finitude of the being in which man 
stands. Man's decisiveness is really decidedness, a revelation of the 
twofold structure of being in a backward-pointing glance to the 
conditions of spirit, to spirit as the history of nature. Resolve reveals 
the same decidedness in a forward-pointing manner. It defines man's 
finitude as a being-toward-the-end, indicates spirit's fragility in the 




It has become evident that Heidegger's fundamental point of 
accord with Schelling, the basis for his sympathy with Schelling despite 
his lack of taste for "absolute philosophy," is his grasp of the radically 
finite character of being. Heidegger reads the Investigations as an 
attempt to fashion a systematic grasp of being from the hermeneutical 
standpoint of man's experience of his radical finitude, his ultimate 
groundlessness. Human existence first brings the structure of being 
into the open as a doubling of being—a split into ground and existent, 
into Sein and Seiendes—and it does this by suffering being. Heidegger 
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would clearly like to read what Schelling points out as man's 
groundedness, the double orientation of his being toward good and 
evil, toward self as self-enclosure and self as gathering thrusting-forth, 
as thrownness pure and simple. Man is a creature out of the ground, 
he lives off of grounds—off of possibilities, bases, reasons—but there is 
no ground for this grounding, no primal possibility for possibilities, no 
reason for reasons. The ground in which man is grounded, from which 
he lives, is ungrounded. Grounding itself is ab-grundig, abysmal, 
utterly without foundation.35 
 
Schelling will not easily be read this way. In the last analysis he 
does not wish to abandon man and history to pure thrownness, but 
sees in the doublefold of being, in the dialectic between spirit's self-
gatheredness and its dispersal in the world, the workings of a 
teleology which will ultimately decide the competing principles in the 
human spirit and subject the ground to existence. This teleology he 
calls the will to love, to revelation. It is an impulse toward an ultimate 
sense of ground and existence, toward a final togetherness 
transcending their fragile differentiation and reunification in man as 
spirit. On the basis of this projected teleological union of principles 
Schelling tries to make sense of their original disparity, their tensed 
unity in emergence or becoming. He searches here for a logic more 
ultimate than that of grounding itself. He attempts to think through 
the ab-grundig character of the structure of being and to convert it 
into an ultimate ground. It is here that Heidegger is forced to 
dissociate himself from Schelling's way of thought. 
 
Schelling has shown that the being of finite, comprehensible 
beings must be thought through difference, the emergent 
differentiation of consequent from ground. All positive predication is of 
finite characters, based ultimately upon difference or upon the logic of 
grounding. Yet the grounding structure is in some ways an ultimate 
dualism, a hidden dialectic which frustrates reason in its desire for 
unity of principles. Grounding reaches only so far as to throw light 
upon the finite and conditioned character of being, upon a necessarily 
unhealed dualism at the basis of things. 
 
Heidegger would say that reason with its demand for unity is 
brought up short at this point, but Schelling disagrees. If reason 
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persists in asking after the ground of grounding—and for him it must—
it must abandon thinking through difference, must therefore abandon 
positive predication, and think through nondifference or "indifference." 
Schelling conceives indifference as a disjunction of principles or 
entities absolutely opposed in themselves. Prior, then, to the split of 
being as ground and being as existent is a principle of indifference 
called the Abgrund or Ungrund, and it is nothing more than the 
disjunction of ground and existence, a logical prior to their actual and 
progressive differentiation in history. 
 
As Schelling describes the primal unground in the Investigations 
it is truly an abysmal principle. Not a product of antitheses, it is a point 
where their opposition has become meaningless. It is the place where 
distinctions break apart upon the rock of their nonbeing, where 
difference is superseded without the differentiae having collapsed in 
themselves (7, 406). It has no proper predicates, only nonaffirmability 
can be affirmed of it. Its inner structure is that of negation, difference, 
grounding, but all as counting for nothing, not so much suppressed as 
not yet made express. It is like a chaotic field of linguistic utterances, 
all possible predicates, before the invention of syntax, i.e., before the 
structure of utterance itself. 
 
There are obvious flaws in this mode of explanation. The claim 
that a logic of nondifference grounds the sense of things founded upon 
difference leaves the sense of "logic," "grounding," and "principle" 
vertiginously near collapse. Schelling confuses the priority of a 
principle with the temporal-causal precedence of a ground, and in his 
search for a ground of grounding postulates a being whose whole 
being is not-to-be-a-ground. The indifferent Abgrund is difference prior 
to itself, i.e., a unitary principle of senselessness grounds the 
doublefold principles of ground and existent whereby anything makes 
sense. Schelling further compounds the confusion by saying that this 
attempt to think experienced duality back to a "neither-nor" justifies 
and grounds the ultimate factical character of that duality. Ground and 
consequent somehow immediately break forth from the indifferent 
"neithernor" (7, 407). 
 
But Heidegger's objections are not, like the above, merely on 
the logical plane. The reversal or confusion of logical and temporal 
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priority we have noted is to him only symptomatic of a deeper error, 
failure to attend to the ontological difference, failure to think through 
being and beings differently. Schelling's persistent questioning after a 
ground to grounding signals a relapse into metaphysics, into a theory 
of being which would remove the unhealed duality from grounding, 
thus remove the duality of the grounding relation itself from the 
meaning of the world and establish the timeless governance of 
"principles" over being. 
 
Heidegger himself adopts Schelling's language of "ground" and 
"groundlessness," but holds it in its purity. Guided by the leading 
thought of the ontological difference—the difference between being 
and beings, between being and the Seiendheit of beings—Heidegger 
refuses conceptually to turn the ungrounded character of being itself, 
the Abgrund or ultimate lack of grounding, into a ground, an ultimate 
explanation of some sort. Only beings are grounded, and if our whole 
categorial scheme is based on the difference of ground and existent, if 
our whole comprehension is based on a logic of grounding, we have no 
proper logic for being itself, no concepts readily available for it, no 
language to enunciate it. Only silence or such language as can be 
fashioned by those ordained to specially suffer being, the poets. Says 
Heidegger, in a passage crucial for understanding his notion of being,  
 
Being and ground belong together. From its coherence with 
being as being the ground receives its essence. Conversely 
being as being takes its rise from the essence of the ground. 
Ground and being ('are') the same—but not identical, as the 
differentiation of the names 'being' and 'ground' already shows. 
Being 'is' in essence: ground. Being thus cannot have a ground 
which it in turn should have to ground. Accordingly, the ground 
falls away from being. Ground remains apart from being. In the 
sense that such a ground is lacking to being, being is the Ab-
grund, the abyss. Insofar as being as such is grounding, it is 
itself groundless.36 
 
Heidegger's objection to Schelling's indifferent absolute, then, is that 
to formulate a ground for grounding is to destroy the essential 
togetherness of being and grounding. When grounding is conceptually 
lifted out of finite being and made a transcendent explanation, the 
sense of being as grounding beings and the sense of grounding itself 
equally perish. And Heidegger objects not only to this attempt to think 
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the groundless character of being into a transcendent ground for 
being, but to Schelling's further attempt to fit finite being and its 
"grundartig" character37 inside a framework processive yet atemporal, 
to locate being in between an origin and an end. For Schelling 
supposes his indifferent Abgrund is not only the absolute, a healing 
over of the doublefold in being, but an origin for being, the point from 
which differentiation breaks forth, from which being as will heads for 
division. This move to insert the emergent character of being into a 
quasi-eternal frame is destructive of the essential finitude of being, a 
deracination of being from history, a denial of being as will. 
 
The Investigations' concept of an indifferent primal ground for 
differentiation is the ghost of the absolute of the Identity System. In 
that earlier static system the indifferent absolute was a field of 
differentiation, an encompassing structure within which every being 
was directly comparable with every other because it was a specified or 
differentiated instance of indifference. The Investigations is quite a 
different system, a philosophy of spirit, an attempt to systematize 
being from the basis of freedom. Whereas in the earlier system 
difference was a quantitative or structural matter, here it is emergence 
into decisiveness, a matter of process and history. Hence Schelling no 
longer conceives the indifferent as absolute in the sense of all-
encompassing and all-founding, but only as a point of origin. The 
indifferent is not the absolute; it is merely the primal basis for what 
may emerge as the absolute, an ultimately unifying act of spirit. 
 
The essence of the ground as well as of the existent can only 
exist as prior to all grounding. It is the absolute, viewed simply, 
the unground. It cannot be in any other fashion-as we have 
proved-than by splitting into two equally eternal beginnings. It 
is not both at the same time, but both in the same way, the 
whole or self-same being in each. The unground divides itself 
into two equally eternal beginnings in order that the two which 
could not be one or exist simultaneously in it as the groundless 
come to be one through love. It divides itself only that life and 
love might come to be, and personal existence (7, 407-08).38 
 
Indifference, then, is not the absolute character of being, but only one 
of its postures, the origin over against which being becomes fully 
personalized in the course of history. It is a "neither-nor" of difference 
only so that difference may break out in acute form, in the doublefold 
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structure or Seynsfuge, and come to fully spiritualized integration in 
love. The grounding structure of being is but being underway, the 
transit from indifference to integration. In Schelling's mind this 
integration is clearly apocalyptic and universal. It is a cosmic decision 
and the fulfillment of the history of nature; it is the rejection of the 
intractable selfhood of the ground, the integration of ordered and 
spiritualized selfhood into the principle of personality or God. This 
integration is clearly envisaged as the overcoming and the purifying of 
the doublefold character of finite being, as a transcending of the 
ambiguity of a structure of being based on nothing more lucid than 
grounding, than emergence from one state into another. 
 
In short, there is for Schelling an absolute indifference of ground 
and existent, a ground for grounding, only in opposition to an absolute 
te/os. Indifference is the equanimity of the cosmos before creation, 
before differentiation. The apocalyptic end is final differentiation, the 
separation of personal deity from the pantheistic totality or the ground 
as refined (7, 408). The processes of finite being in between origin and 
end take on the significance, in the last analysis, only of an in-
between. There is no ultimate significance in the process, only in its 
terms, in origin and end, in benign indifference and divine aloofness. 
The doublefold of finite being whose whole meaning, as the 
Investigations most of the time strains so hard to establish, is in 
process, in grounding, in being as emergence, is in the end disvalued. 
Schelling's bold view that the decision of being involves human 
freedom, good and evil, disappears in the subtle weavings of theodicy; 
the ambiguity of the shifting states of finite being, symbolized by the 
"and," is resolved. "Good and evil" is made a temporary state, an 
imperfect form of differentiation to be completed in apocalypse. If the 
"decision" in human freedom is always, as Schelling indicates, 
ambiguous decision, the outbreak of double possibilities of selfhood, 
then there must be an ultimate cosmic decision which is truly divisive, 
which will decide one thing over another, resolve the ambiguity into 
monocular clarity. 
 
It is this framing of the structure of being with its unhealed 
duality and its burden of ambiguity between origin and end which 
Heidegger cannot accept. The move is metaphysical; that it comes at 
the very end of the Investigations shows the lure of the forgetfulness 
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of being, reveals our typical discomfort in the face of the ambiguous 
uncoverings of being. It is interesting not as a particular mistake, but 
as a symptom of the general movement of thought. The more 
Schelling struggles against his discovery of the indefinite duality, 
tension, or ambiguity at the heart of being, the more he tries to unite 
(identify) the moments of the structure of being, the more they fall 
apart and the more he is forced to repeat the mistakes first made in 
the beginning of Western thought. Because Schelling essentially 
uncovered the doublefold or essentially finite character of being, says 
Heidegger, his final failure is all the more poignant. Poignant but also 
productive, for it forces upon us the urgency of trying a "second 
beginning" in the history of being, or opening up a nonmetaphysical 
seynsgeschlichtlich grasp of being.39 
 
The Greek mistake must be avoided, namely, the attempt to 
explain the elusive and dialectical character of being in terms of 
beings, to explain its situatedness between the mortal and the divine, 
between openness and hiddenness in terms of object-like components, 
origin and te/os, themselves exempt from process and situation. Such 
finalizing principles cannot be principles of being; at best they are 
principles over being, principles which are only principles, in no sense 
the origin and ordering movement within the doublefold structure of 
being. Origin and end deprive logos, the unification and articulation of 
being invented by finite spirit's standing within being, of its sense; as 
supposed principles they violate the sense of what they are to explain 
and order—even if, as Schelling maintains, the origin is merely the 
nullity or indifference point of all the strife and division being exhibits 
and the telos, a love which reconciles differences while preserving their 
autonomy. Taking with utmost seriousness Schelling's doctrine that 
the origin must be the nullity of all the tensions the doublefold of being 
brings to light, Heidegger points out that it cannot be an origin for 
being: 
 
Absolute indifference is nothing in the sense that in contrast to 
it every assertion of being is nothing, but not in the sense that 
the absolute is nUll, purely worthless. But here Schelling does 
not see the necessity of a central step. If in truth being cannot 
be predicated of the absolute, it follows that the essence of all 
being is finitude and that only the finite existent has the 
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privilege and the pain of standing in being as such and 
experiencing the true as a being.40 
 
The "nothing" of finitude is the heart of being, the thrown 
freedom which makes man a Wesen der Ferne, which makes him the 
open in-between of the hiddenness and the revelation of being.41 It is 
neither mere nothingness nor nothing as a thing. Nor is it Schelling's 
transcendent nothingness or indifference upon which all differences, 
hence all finite characters of beings, break and burst asunder. The 
nothing of the in-between is indicated only in terms of situation, of 
tension between extremes; it cannot be formulated in terms of the 
unity of things and principles. 
 
At the heart of being is an ambiguous duality. It is a duality, and 
so cannot be comprehended by unitary principles; it is an ambiguous 
duality, and so resists simplification to a definite opposition formulable 
in terms of two principles. Thus we have named it generically "the 
doublefold." Heidegger maintains that if we refrain from reifying the 
structure of being experienced in human freedom and grasp thrown 
responsibility in its full tension—the inner dialectic of "place" and 
"project"—the fragile doublefold may be preserved in its delicacy. 
Ontology must live within being's essential equivocation and, avoiding 
single meanings (prose) and single principles (metaphysics), learn to 
speak equivocally. Being as grounding is abysmal, ab-gtundig. He who 
would speak out (ultimately the poet, if anyone) must go into the 
abyss, must renounce the comfort of the single meaning and the single 
vision which the horizon of the everyday offers. He must seek 
apartness, for apartness is spirit and gathering power.42 Gathering 
power is logos, the gathering of being, and the poet's speaking, 
worked out in the listening of apartness, becomes the "house of being" 
only because poetry is not so much invention as preservation and 
repetition. The poetic word brings apartness itself to a stand and rings 
out the fragility of being in all its necessary equivocations. It takes its 
stand in ambiguities, faithful to what is, and this faithfulness is central 
to its claim to replace metaphysics, to its position as the second 
beginning in the history of being.43 
 
The doublefold of being, found in apartness as the in-between or 
the precarious dialogue of the divine and mortal, of the world and the 
human, allows of no healing. Being is radically finite, that is, not 
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fenced in from without but uncertain, divided, and ambiguous within. 
Grounding, or the sense of things, is groundless; one cannot find a 
"reason" to explain why possibilities present themselves, bases open 
up and causes preserve the sense of things for us. There is no 
transcending the finitude of "sense"; on the contrary, being breaks 
out, shows its transcendence, only within this finitude. The "because" 
finally loses itself in the play of being, a play which is only play, which 
plays because it plays. The "why" drops out of being experienced in 
any depth or profundity, and to attempt to fit being into the limits of 
the "why," as Schelling ultimately does, is only to mutilate what sense 
it has, to destroy its contingency and fragility, to close over its open 
texture and mute its sharp divisions with a logic of closure and 
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